

# Making Sense of “Moderating Political Extremism” Bordignon et al (2016)

Can Runoff Elections Help?  
Evidence from Italy



# Causal Questions



- Bordignon, Massimo, Tommaso Nannicini, and Guido Tabellini. 2016. "Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule." *American Economic Review*, 106 (8): 2349-70.
- First Question: Is there is an effect of these systems on the number of candidates running for office?
- Second Question: Is a single ballot voting system more accommodating of political extremes than a runoff election under plurality rule system?
  - i.e., Are more extreme policies implemented under one of these systems?

# Background: Electoral System



## Two Systems: Runoff vs. Plurality


- Subjects of Interest: Municipal Elections in Cities across Italy
- Timeline: Elections between 1993 and 2007
- Elections for both mayor and city council (focus on mayor for simplicity)
- Populations under 15,000: single ballot elections for mayor
  - System: candidate that receives the most votes becomes mayor, regardless of if it was a majority or merely a plurality
- Populations over 15,000: runoff elections for mayor
  - System: if a candidate receives over half the vote, that candidate is elected, otherwise the two candidates with the most votes participate in a runoff election. Winner becomes mayor

# Data



- Sample consists of 2,027 mayoral terms from 1993-2007 from 661 towns, 10% of all Italian municipalities.
- City **population size** is from two censuses: 1991 and 2001.
- Primary outcomes of interest:  
**Number of Mayoral Candidates** & Business Tax Rate Volatility
- Observed Covariates: per capita income, per capita transfers, age index, household size, location (north, central or south of Italy), altitude, area, participation rate, days in office of mayoral term, term limit policy
- Three sources:
  - ANCI (*Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani*) for population, geography, and demography
  - Statistical Office of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs for political variables
  - Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs for municipal tax rate on business property

# RDD and Econometric Strategy



Require Continuity of Potential Outcomes across  $P_c = 15,000$

- Truncated data to populations between 10,000 and 20,000
- Lack of evidence/feasibility of sorting on population around threshold
- Assumption of  $E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)|P_i = P_c] = \lim_{P_i \rightarrow P_c^+} Y_i - \lim_{P_i \rightarrow P_c^-} Y_i$ .

Models:  
Local Linear

$$Y_i = \sum_{k=0}^p (\delta_k P_i^{*k}) + D_i \sum_{k=0}^p (\gamma_k P_i^{*k}) + \epsilon_i$$

Polynomial Spline


$$Y_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 P_i^* + D_i(\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 P_i^*) + \epsilon_i$$




A wide-angle photograph of the Grand Canal in Venice, Italy, captured at dusk. The sky is a deep, dark blue with scattered white clouds. The water of the canal is a vibrant blue, reflecting the warm, golden lights from the buildings and street lamps along the banks. On the left, a large, ornate building with many windows is brightly lit. In the foreground, a gondola with several people is moving across the water. On the right, a row of buildings with balconies and awnings is also illuminated, with some outdoor seating areas visible. The overall atmosphere is romantic and historic.

# Results and Analysis


# Manipulative Sorting and McCrary Tests




McCrary Test for Density of City Populations from 1991 Census  
p-Value: 0.02




Density of City Populations from 1991 and 2001 Census






McCrary Test for Density of City Populations from 2001 Census  
p-Value: 0.12



Testing for sorting between 1991 and 2001 Census



# Loess and Bandwidth Sensitivity



Summary Table of Selected Models

Outcome: <i>Number of Candidates</i>	Est.	S.E.	t-value
Estimation without covariates			
LLR(h)	1.3	0.408	3.185
LLR(h/4)	1.524	1.090	1.398
LLR(optimal h)	1.064	0.352	3.025
Estimation with covariates			
LLR(h)	1.331	0.396	3.366
LLR(optimal h)	1.105	0.343	3.218





# Covariate Balance and Benchmarking




Do observed covariates, that might affect the outcome, jump at threshold?

- Placebo outcome tests indicate no statistically significant jumps.
- Running baseline model through *sensemkr* shows that 50x the strongest covariate effect is required to eliminate the treatment effect entirely. 20x for sig.

Balance Table				
Covariate	Est.	SE	t	p-value
area	-4.27	19.65	-0.22	0.83
alt_max	-40.60	149.55	-0.27	0.79
end_rev_transf_pc	-15.93	73.56	-0.22	0.823
income_pc	-283.58	484.72	-0.59	0.56
elderly_index	0.02	0.08	0.31	0.76
active_pop	-0.00	0.01	-0.51	0.61
family_size	0.01	0.04	0.25	0.80
duration	20.26	81.63	0.25	0.80





# Additional Robustness Analyses

- Falsification test on pre-1993 potential outcomes (1985-1992)
  - No significant discontinuity detected
- DID for cities crossing threshold from 1991 to 2001 census
  - Results are similar to RDD
- Placebo thresholds (1,000 different thresholds)
  - Only 1.6% of placebo estimates are larger in abs. val. than baseline result
- Alternative bandwidths
  - Estimates are similar to baseline
- Spline fits of various orders
  - Estimates are similar to baseline
- Additional outcome variables
  - Estimates are similar to baseline
- Optimal bandwidth

## Takeaways:

- **Runoff elections seem to increase no. candidates and reduce policy volatility**
- **Results seem fairly robust**



# Discussion

# Unobserved Confounding



- For the RDD Design, the confounding question becomes chiefly whether we believe that there is a covariate that will change across the threshold that affects the outcome
  - Policies that could be implemented at 15,000 population, such as a bump in tax rate, crime rate policies, differences in immigration policies
  - Difficult to speculate without deep knowledge of Italian bureaucratic system
  - Benchmarking against observed covariates



# Internal and External Validity

## Internal Validity


- Confounding
- Manipulative Sorting
- Pretreatment Period (Falsification Test)
- Attached Voters

## External Validity

- Country & Years
- RDD only identified at threshold




Figure A1: Drop in turnout between first and second round



Notes. Vertical axis: drop in turnout between first and second round (expressed as a fraction of eligible voters). Horizontal axis: total votes for the excluded candidates in the first round (expressed as a fraction of eligible voters). Municipalities between 15,000 and 20,000 only.

# Takeaways



- Results indicate that runoff elections are associated with
  - Increased number of candidates
  - Decreased policy volatility
- Results survive most of the common RDD robustness analyses
- Unobserved confounding is possible, but likely not significantly at the RDD threshold
- Internal validity is high
- External validity is low
- Italian municipal elections are complicated 😊



# Questions